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IN THE
SUPREME COURT

OF' THE
STATE OF UTAH

EBEN BLOMQUIST!
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS.

J. DAL PETERSON and KARL D.
BLOMQUIST, and MINERALS
RECOVERY COMPANY, aka MINERAL
RECOVERY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
By his amended complaint, filed October 15, 1976
(R. 15-18), Plaintiff seeks to recover the sum of $10,222.00
with interest and attorney's fees on a note (R. 75)

executed

by Defendants J. Dal Peterson and Karl W. Blomquist in favor
of plaintiff.

Plaintiff seeks an adjudication by the Court

that the promissory note is secured by a certain piece of
mining equipment known as a "belt tank".

Title to the belt

tank was assigned to Defendant. Minerals Recovery Corporation
by Defendant Peterson.
By the terms of the promissory note, Defendants Peterson
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-2and Blomquist were jointly and severally liable.

On

February 9, 1977, a default judgment on the promissory
note was entered against Defendant Peterson with interest
and attorney's fees

(R. 41).

On October 13, 1976, Plaintiff

and Defendant Blomquist stipulated that the belt tank could
be sold pursuant to the established procedures of the District
Court, and that the proceeds from the sale could be use to pay
the promissory note plus interest and cost of the action
(R. 69-70).
In Defendant Mineral Recovery Corporation's answer to the
plaintiff's canplaint (R. 20-23)

filed November 8, 1976, Min-

eral Recovery Corporation denied that the promissory note had
been secured by the belt tank.

Specifically, Mineral Recovery

alleged that there existed no security interest in the belt
tank in favor of the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff and the
Defendants Peterson and Blomquist had not executed a security
agreement, pursuant to UCA § 70A-9-203.
On June 7, 1977, Plaintiff moved the District Court for
summary judgment (R. 67) based upon the following documents:
1.

Default judg?r.ent against Defendant Peterson (R. 41)

2.

Stipulation of Defendant Blomquist and the Plaintiff
(R. 69-70)

3.

The affidavit of the Plaintiff (R.

71-75)
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,

-34.

The affidavit of Defendant Blomquist

5.

The affidavit of Sidney Horman (R. 76-77)

On July 11, 1977, Defendant Mineral Recovery Corporation also
moved for summary judgment (R. 86-87).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The motions for summary judgment were heard before the
District Court, Honorable David B. Dee presiding, on July 14,
1977.

At the

~aring,

the Court considered the question of

whether there existed a valid security agreement between the
Plaintiff and the Defendants Peterson and Blomquist.

The

court denied the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
entered judgme.nt in favor of the Defendant Minerals Recovery
Corporation (R. 112-113).

The District Court, in its memor-

andum decision, held that UCA ~ 70A-9-203 " ... does not allow
the creation of a security agreement under the facts in this
case taking the promissory note and financing statement together and reading them in a light mcst favorable to the
plaintiff ... " (R.124).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks the following relief on appeal:
1.

A determination that a valid security agreement

pursuant to UCA

s 70A-9-203

was entered into by the Plaintiff

and the Defendants Peterson and Blomquist, securing the
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promissory note by the belt tank.
2.

A determination that the Plaintiff is entitled to

an order by the District Court providing for the sale of
the belt tank in accordance with the rules and practices
of the District Court, to satisfy the Plaintiff's judgment
on the note.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On June 11, 1974, Defendants J. Dal Peterson and

Karl W. Blomquist executed a promissory note (R. 75)
$10,222.00 in favor of Plaintiff, Eben J. Blomquist.

for
The

note was due and payble in one installment on September 1,
1974.

At the bottom of the note the following notion appears:

"This note is secured by a Security Agreement of even date."
2.

At the time the promissory note was executed, a

financing statement (R.74) was signed by Defendants Blomquist
and Peterson (R. 71-72).

It was understood at this time that

these two Defendants were to give a certain belt tank as
security for the promissory note (R. 71-72).

The financing

statement was filed August 7, 1974 in the office of the Secretary of State (R. 73-74).

The financing statement (R. 74)

contains the following information:
A.

The names of the Defendants Carl W. Blomquist and

J. Dal Peterson and the address of J. Dal Peterson.
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-5B.

The name of the Plaintiff, including the Plaintiff's

address.
C.

A detailed description of the belt tank: "Mining

Equipment - specifically 1-90' Belt Tank including electric
motors, hoppers, Belt, and other attached equipment now
located at Notum, Utah".
Signatures of Defendants, Carl W. Blomquist and J. Dal

D.
Peterson.
E.

Signature of the Plaintiff, Eben J. B1omquist.

F.

The date of the filing of the financing statement.

G.

"maturity date" specified as September 1, 1974,

referring to the maturity date of pranissory note.

3.

At the time the promissory note was signed by the

Defendants, Defendant Peterson had title to and was in rightful
possession of the belt tank (R. 76-77; 72).

Also, at the time

the financing statement was filed, Defendant Peterson still
had title to and was in possession of the belt tank.
sequent to

Sub-

thefiling of the financing statement, Defendant

Peterson assigned the belt tank to Mineral Recovery Corporation
(R.

65).
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-6ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
A WRITING SIGNED BY THE DEBTOR IS REQUIRED
BEFORE A SECURITY INTEREST CAN BE CREATED IN
FAVOR OF THE SECURED PARTY
UCA § 70A-9-203(1) (b)

provides that " ... a security interest

is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless
the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a
<:Escri.ption of the collateral." The description " ... is sufficient
whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what
is described." UCA § 70A-9-110.

"Security Agreement" is defined

as " ... an agreement which creates or provides for a security
interest ... " UCA § 70A-9-105 (h) .

The foregoing language from

Article 9 is the only language that can be found in the Uniform
Commercial Code in reference to determining the question of
whether a valid security agreement exists between the debtor and
the secured party.

Obviously, because of the lack of statutory

definition and language, the que3tion of what constitutes a
valid "security agreement" is open to a wide range of judicial
interpreta ticn.

The question before the instant court is

the financinq statement (R. 74)

and promissory note

. I

whet~er

(R.75)

constitute a valid security aqreement under UCA § 70A-9-203 ( l', lb
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POINT II.
THE FINANCING STATEMENT AND THE PROMISSORY
NOTE OF THE INSTANT CASE CONSTITUTE A VALID
SECURITY AGREEMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF
UCA § 70A-9-203 ( 1) (b)
The established rule in American Jurisprudence in regard
to the "security agreement" requirement of§ 9-203(l)(b)

is

that the "security agreement" need not be confined to only one
document formally designated as "Security Agreement".

Multiple

documents _can serve to establish the prerequisites of § 9-203
(1)

(b).

In re Arnex-Protein Development Corp., .504 F2d 1056

(9th Cir. 1974)

(promissory note, invoices, and financing

statement were evidence of a valid security agreement); In re
Numeric:: Corporation,.
Housing Corp.,

485 F2d 1328 (1st Cir. 1973); In re Penn

367 F.Supp 661 (WD pa. 1973)

(financing statement

promissory notes and letters constituted valid security agreements); In re Martronics, 2 UCC Rep 364 (D Conn., Ref., aff'd
by Dist. Ct.

1964) (loan agreement, promissory note and financing

statement constituted security agreement); In re Fibre. Glass Boat
Corp.,

324 F. Supp 1054 (DCSD Fla., 1971), aff'd w/o opinion

448 F2d 781 (5th Cir., 1971) (letter arrl financing statement
constituted valid security agreement) ; Clark v. Vaughn,

504 SW

2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973 (motor vehicle title certificate
constituted valid security agreement): In In re Numeric Corp.,
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-8supra at 1331, the court gave the foll::iwing rationale for the
above rule:
.•. we have little difficulty concluding
that a separate formal document entitled
"Security Agreement" is not always necessary to satisfy a signed-writing requirement of § 9-203(1) (bl. The draftsmen of the UCC ascribed two purposes to
that requirement. One purpose was evidentiary, to prevent disputes as to precisely
which items of property are covered by a
security interest. (citations omitted)
The
second purpose of the signed-writing requirement is to serve as a Statute of Frauds,
preventing the enforcement of claims based
on wholly oral representations. (citation
omitted) .
Given these two limited purposes of
§ 9-203(1) (b) and the flexible definitions
of "security agreement" found elsewhere in
the Code, there seems to be no need to insist upon a separate document entitled
"security agreement" as a prerequisite
for enforcement for an otherwise valid
security interest. A writing or writings,
regardless of lable, which adequately
describes the collateral, carries the signature of the debtor, and establishes that
in fact a security interest was agreed upon
would satisfy both the formal requirements
of the statute and the policies behind it.
(citations omitted)
In defining the phrase " ... an agreement which creates or
provides for a security interest ... ," Courts have gene-i:ally
agreed that formal or technical granting language is not required to create a valid security agreement within the meaning
of this

statutory language (UCA § 70A-9-105(h).

Generally,

courts have held that a security interest will be deemed to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-9have been created if the court can ascertain from the four
corners of the various documents the requisite intent on the
part of the parties to create such a security interest.
Nottingham, 6 UCC Rep 1197 (DCED Tenn., Ref., 1969);

In re

~

v. Everett, 279 NC 352, 183 SE 2d 109 (1971); In re Barney,

344 F.Supp 694 (DC Ida., 1972); Clark v. Vaughn, supra.

The

Court in Nottingham, supra at 1199 stated this rule in the
following lan0uage:
There are no magic words that create a
security interest. There must be language,
however, in the instrument which when read
and const:i::ued leads to the logical conclusion
that it was the intention of the parties
that a security interest be created ... The
requirements of the code for creating a
security interest are aimple ~ ad intention
to create a security interest is all that
need be shown - a dozen words or less are
sufficient ...
As the Court stated in Barney, supra at 697:
"Clearly, a security interest can be created
or cane into existance without using the
magic words "security interest."
In Clark v. Vaughn, supra, the court found that an automobile
title certificate constituted a valid security agreement.

The

court in reaching this conclusion held that specific granting
language was not required to create a valid security interest:
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I

-10The record does not include a written
agreement signed by Clark stating specifically that Vaughn shall have a lien
on or security interest in the automobil~.
but it does contain the title certificate,.
which as the trial court found, was signed
by Clark and delivered to Vaughn.
It contained a description of the collateral, and
was undoubtedly intended by both parties to
be written evidence of Vaughn's interest in
the vehicle, and, while the question is not
free from doubt, we hold that it was sufficient
to constitute a signed security agreement within the meaning of section 9-203. (Clark v.
Vaughn, supra at 553)
It is apparent from the foregoing case law that specific,
technical granting language is not a prerequisite to the creation'

I
of a security interest and that a court in ascertaining whether
or not a valid security agreement exists, can rely upon language within the various related documents evidencing an intent
on the part of the parties to create a security interest.
There is one case on point.

In In re Center Auto Parts,

6 UCC Rep 398 (CD Calif. 1968), the debtor made a promissory
note which stated:
statement."

"This note is secured by a certain financing

The debtor and the secured party also signed a

financing statement and filed it.

The court found that the

promissory note "created and provided for a security interest"'.
pursuant to 9-203 (i) (b).

I
I
I
if

The court also found that the financi"'

statement adequately identified the ro llateral based on the tes'. I
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of

5

70A-9-ll0.

The court also took note of the fact that the

financing statement was the only one on file between the parties.
Thus,

it was held that the promissory note and the financing

statement together constituted a valid security agreement.
The following is the analysis used by the court in reaching its
decision:
Section 9203 of the Commercial Code provides
in pertinent part that a security interest is
not enforceable against the debtor or third
parties unless the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description
of the collateral. Thus, the following three
questions must be answered in the affirmative
in order to allow respondent to stand as a
secured creditor:
(1) Has the Agreement Been Signed by the Debtor?
Clearly both the note and the Financing Statement have been signed by the debtor.
(2)

Is it a "Security Agreement"?
A "security agreement" is defined in Section
9-105 ( 1) (h) of the Commercial Code as an "agreement which creates or provides for a security
interest." As did:the court in the case of
American Card Company v. H.M.H. CO., 196 A2d 150
(1 UCC Rep 447) (RI 1963), this court concludes
that the Financing Statement, though it is
signed by the debtors and contains a description
of the property, does not standing alone allow a
priority for a valid security interest since the
financing statement filed in the office of the
Secretary of State did not contain the debtor's
grant of security interest. However, the note
does in fact "create and provide for a security
interest."
Its language is clear that a sec-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12urity interest was to be granted by the
execution of the note for it states,
"This note is secured by a certain
financing statement."
It has been stipulated that the financing statement in
evidence is the only one between the
parties. Thus, by looking to the financing statement, the property provided by
the debtors as security for the loan
made by respondent is identified.
(3)

Does it Contain a Description of the Colj_ateral?
Section 9-110 of the Commercial Code state.s,
"Sufficiency of Description. For purposes of
this division (this Article) any description
of personal property or real estate is sufficient
whether or not it is specific if it reasonably
I
identifies what is described." The note describes
the collateral by reference to the Financing
Statement. The Financing Statement lists as the I
collateral the inventory of auto parts and office r
furnishings.
The address of the chief place of
business of Center Auto Parts is provided in the
Financing Statement.
"It is not essential that
the descr+ption be so specific that the property
may be identified by it alone, if such description/
suggests inquiries or means of identification
which, if pursued, will disclose the property cov-1
ered. This rule is based upon "the maxim, that is
certain which is capable of being made certain."
(Citation omitted) (In re Center Auto Parts, ~
at 399-4ooJ
I
1

I

It should be noted that the opinion in In re Center Auto
Parts has been reviewed by many jurisdictions and has become a
respected precedent in American Jurisprudence for defining the
UCC Article 9 provision dealing with "security agreement."
The following jurisdictions expressly approve of or at least
favorably cite the opinion:

In Re Penn Housing Corp .• supra;
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In re Amex-Protein, supra; In re Harmon, 6 UCC Rep 1280
(DCD Conn., Ref., 1969); In re Numeric, supra; In re
Nottingham, supra; Evans v. Everett, supra.
Generally, the mere fact that a majority of jurisdictions follow a certain precedent is not persuasive
with a court of law.

A court of law is more concerned with

the underlying rationale and soundness of the rule.

Ho\<\Sver,

in the case of UCC statutory interpretation, the mere fact
of precedent is a factor properly to be weighed by the Court.
UCA § 70A-102(2) provides that an underlying purpose and
policy of the UCC is " ... to make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions."
It should be apparent that the instant promissory note
and financing statement together constitute a valid security
agreement under the foregoing case law.

The promissory note

clearly specifies the terms of the agreement, the debtors"
signatures appear on the note, and the note states: "This note
is secured by a Security Agreement of even date."

The financing

statement on file between the parties clearly identifies the
collateral, all parties involved signed the statement, and the
"maturity date" specified on the financing statement is the
identical date specified on the note as the date the note is due.
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Obviously, the language,

"This note is secured by a

certain Security Agreement of even date",

in conjunction

with the other items of information contained in the two
documents, clearly "creates
interest".

or provides for a security

Based upon the· test of Nottingham, supra, it is

apparent that when these two documents are read and construed
together, it must be logically concluded that the parties
intended a security interest.

According to the Nottingham

test, the intent of the parties is all that need be shown.
It should also be noted that the facts of the instant case
and the facts of In re Center Auto Parts, su12ra are substan-:.-ially identical.

There is no substantial difference between

the phrase of the instant note, "This note is 5ecured by a
certain

~ecurity

Agreement of even date," and the phrase of

the note in In re Center Auto Parts,
by a certain financing statement."
evidence the requisite intent.

"This note is secured
Both phrases clearly

However, it should also be

noted that the phrase of the instant note unequivocally states
that the requisite security agreement exists between the

parti~·

whereas the phrase in the note of In re Center Auto Parts,
only implies that such an agreement exists.

~

Thus, the requisite

intent is more easily found in the instant case than in In re
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-15Center Auto Parts, supra.
POINT III.
THE RULE OF LAW THAT MULTIPLE DOCUMENTS
CAN SERVE AS A VALID SECURITY AGREEMENT
IS IN HARMONY WITH THE UNDERLYING
PURPOSES AND POLICIES OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Under Article 9 of the UCC, the requirements of a valid
security agreement have been greatly simplified.

The pre-code

ccrnplexities and technical forms and distinctions have been
abolished.

Comment to 9-101.

The only specific requirements

in the Code are those found in ~ ?OA-9-203(1) (b).
of

S

70A-9-203(l)(b)

The purpose

is to serve as a statute of frauds,

preventing claims based wholly upon oral representation.
The section also has an evidentiary purpose to prevent disputes
as to which items of property are subject to the security
interest.

Comment 3 and 5 to 9-203; In re Numeric, supra.

The Code does not specif:• that a piece of paper designated as
"security agreement" be used in fulfilling these purposes, nor
does it forbid the use of a financing statement or other types
of documents or even a combination of documents.

The Code is

completely silent as to methods by which the purposes of

s

70A-9-203 ( 1) (b)

should be fulfilled.

The Code, however, does provide some guidelines as to how
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-16its provisions should be construed.

In

s 70A-l-102(1),

the

Code states that "this act should be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."
The underlying purposes and policies of the UCC are" ... to
simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
practices;

(and)

to make uniform the law among the various

jurisdictions."§ 70A-9-102(2).
In the instant case, a promissory note and a financing
statement which are, without question,

part of the same trans-

action, clearly fulfill the purposes of !i-70A-9-203 ( 1) (b).

The

two documents together constitute a complete and integrated
written security agreement.

Thus, the evidentiary and statute

of frauds purposes of § 70A-9-203(1) (b)

are fulfilled.

CONCLUSION
Any combination of documents can satisfy the requirements
of a signed security agreement, pursuant to UCA
The documents together must show:
debtor,
(3)

(1)

s

70A-9-203.

the signature of the

(2) an adequate description of the collateral and

intent to create a security interest.

The promissory note

and financing statement together satisfy these three requirement;.
Thus, a valid security agreement exists between the Plaintiff a~:
the Defendants Blomquist and Peterson.
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The foregoing is respectfully submitted.
LORIN N. PACE
RANDALL BUNNELL
431 South Third East, B-1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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